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extend its maritime strategic depth and
to disrupt and deny the absolute U.S.
superiority in the narrow “East Asian
littoral” or turn it into a “zone of contestation.” China’s strategies and capabilities, according to Shi, are likely to be
asymmetrical, and they can benefit from
such modern technologies as long-range
combat aircraft and missiles. China’s
acquisition of major naval surface
combatants mainly serves to supplement such capabilities, as well as to
protect vital sea-lanes on which China’s
economy depends. On the other hand,
reduced U.S. military forward presence
and globalization-induced nontraditional security challenges are likely to offer
opportunities for Sino-U.S. cooperation.
This is probably one of the few Chinese
books that reflect not only an in-depth
understanding of Western naval literature but also analytical ability to evaluate
this literature critically to gain insight
into current U.S.-China relations. Because the author serves as a research fellow and a managing editor of the journal
Strategic Studies at the War Theory and
Strategic Studies Department of China’s
Academy of Military Science, the book
may reflect an important perspective for
understanding the extent and nature of
China’s quest for sea power.
Nan Li

China Maritime Studies Institute
Naval War College

Yahuda, Michael. Sino-Japanese Relations after
the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain.
New York: Routledge, 2014. 146pp. $149.50 (paperback $33.18)

Veteran East Asia international relations
analyst Michael Yahuda explores the
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traditional Chinese aphorism yī shān bù
róng èr hǔ, or “two tigers competing for
one mountain” (一山不容二虎), in analyzing the changing relationship of the
two great powers of East Asia—China
and Japan. The proverb is a good foil
for his subject and has led to a nuanced
and balanced essay on Chinese-Japanese
relations during the forty-plus years
since the two established diplomatic
ties in 1972. His book is succinct. Each
sentence pushes the narrative forward,
making the book an ideal synopsis
for busy policy analysts or East Asia
students with extensive reading lists.
The chronological meat of the book is
a detailed discussion of key periods in
Chinese-Japanese relations, starting
with the rapprochement between Mao
Zedong and Kakuei Tanaka in the 1970s.
In 1972, Mao forgave the Japanese for
twentieth-century aggression, even forgoing war reparations. China’s economic
reform movement began with Deng
Xiaoping’s visit to Japan in 1978, setting
the stage for the 1980s honeymoon period before the Cold War ended. This is
instructive, because it demonstrates that
tigers can more happily coexist during
some periods than at other times.
Yahuda then discusses Japan as the
first country to reembrace China after
the isolation imposed on Beijing in the
wake of the Tiananmen crackdown of
1989. As the Soviet Union folded in
1991, bringing the Cold War to a close,
the trajectory of Japan as number one
leveled off into a two-decade period of
economic stagnation. In contrast, Deng
successfully transferred the helm and the
reform mission to Jiang Zemin before
passing away in 1997. By 2000 Chinese
gross domestic product (GDP) had
grown to 25 percent that of Japan’s. The
relationship between Jiang and Prime
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Minister Junichiro Koizumi went
steadily downhill between 2000 and
2005, as Koizumi repeatedly visited
the Yasukuni Shrine; Jiang played the
history card at every turn, having none
of Mao’s forget-and-forgive approach.
The relationship improved when Shinzo
Abe replaced Koizumi in 2005, but the
subsequent annual turnover of Japan’s
prime ministers gave Hu Jintao’s steady
hand on the tiller time to overtake Japan
economically, as well as to spend heavily
on military infrastructure improvements, most notably on the People’s
Liberation Army Navy. By 2010, China’s
GDP had surpassed Japan’s, and its economy was the second largest in the world,
after that of the United States. Periodic
conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands has recently led to a series of
status quo changes in China’s favor, as
China’s leadership baton was handed
to Xi Jinping in November 2012 and
Japan’s returned to Abe, reelected in
December 2012. China and Japan both
bristle over naval patrols and air-defense
zones around the disputed islands, as
well as, in Japan’s case, at Xi’s demands
for twentieth-century-history apologies
from Japan, while Abe for his part visited Yasukuni in late December 2013 on
the anniversary of his first year in office.
The theoretical meat of the book is no
less interesting. Yahuda uses a blend of
sociocultural constructivist approaches,
liberal economic and institutional interdependence analysis, and realist strategic
analysis to discuss the complex interrelationship between China and Japan, as
well as their competitive relations with
the Koreas, Taiwan, and the states of
Southeast Asia. In Yahuda’s analysis,
the United States is the key swing
variable in the relationship between
the Asian tigers, first as Japan’s ally
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and second as China’s opposite on the
world stage of great-power relations.
A version of the “two tigers” Chinese
proverb was used recently by S. C. M.
Paine in her book The Wars for Asia,
1911–1949 (2012). She used the phrase
to refer to the two protagonists of the
long Chinese civil war, the Nationalists
and the Communists. Her translation
gloss, “Great rivals cannot co-exist,”
implies a zero-sum game. Yahuda’s
conclusion is that two tigers on a
single mountain need not represent a
zero-sum game. He posits that in the
period ahead, the two tigers, China
and Japan, must share the same mountain, East Asia. Recent events confirm
that this is a tough matchup, with both
tigers snarling ferociously, neither
inclined to back down the mountain.
Grant F. Rhode

Boston University

Yetiv, Steve A. National Security through a Cockeyed Lens: How Cognitive Bias Impacts U.S. Foreign Policy. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press, 2013. 168pp. $24.95

There’s an old saying, usually attributed
to Mark Twain, that the Missouri River
is “too thick to drink and too thin to
plow.” At first glance, the same might
be said for this book, in that Steve Yetiv
seeks to appeal to the scholar, to the
practitioner, and to the lay reader, serving the lay reader best but not without
utility to the practitioner and scholar.
Yetiv is the Louis L. Jaffe Professor of
International Relations at Old Dominion University and University Professor. His premise in this book is simple.
Cognitive biases impact human decision
making and tend to reduce the impact
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